We show that, under some natural conditions, the pairs ðr; sÞ produced by the elliptic curve ElGamal signature scheme are uniformly distributed. In particular, this implies that values of r and s are not correlated. The result is based on some new estimates of exponential sums. For the ElGamal signature over a finite field, a similar result has been obtained by the second author. # 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
INTRODUCTION
Let p ! 3 be a prime and let g be a primitive root modulo p. For an integer m ! 2, we also denote by Z m residue ring modulo m (which we identify with the set of integers f0; . . . ; m À 1g) and by Z * m the group of units of Z m .
The ElGamal signature scheme can be described in the following way. Let M be a finite set of messages to be signed and let h : M ! Z pÀ1 be an arbitrary function, usually called a hash-function. We assume that the primitive root g is publicly known. The signer fixes a certain element a 2 Z pÀ1 which is the secret key known only to the signer and makes the value A g a ðmod pÞ publicly known. Finally, for an integer k 2 Z * pÀ1 called a nonce and a message m 2 M we define the functions rðkÞ and sðk; mÞ by 1 To whom correspondence should be addressed. and call the pair ðrðkÞ; sðk; mÞÞ the ElGamal signature of the message m with nonce k, see [6, 12] . It has been shown in [10] that the distribution of pairs ðrðkÞ; sðk; mÞÞ is asymptotically uniform in the rectangle ½0; p À 1 Â ½0; p À 2.
The elliptic curve ElGamal signature is the elliptic curve analogue of the above algorithm (see [4] where now h : M ! Z N . The pair ðrðkÞ; sðk; mÞÞ is the elliptic curve ElGamal signature of the message m with a nonce k. In this paper, we obtain the elliptic curve analogue of the result of [10] and show that the pairs ðrðkÞ; sðk; mÞÞ are uniformly distributed in the rectangle ½0; p À 1 Â ½0; N À 1. We remark that even studying only the first component rðkÞ is not trivial and require several algebraic geometry tools [5] .
Although the uniformity of distribution results of [10] and this paper do not have any immediate implications for the security of the corresponding cryptographic constructions, they still provide some intuitive motivation for such conclusions. In particular, in each of the above cases the inverse statement (about non-uniformity of distribution) would be disastrous for the corresponding construction.
On the other hand, surprisingly enough, certain uniformity of distribution properties could be a tool for an attack as well. For example, a statement about the uniform distribution of the elements ðkÞðk; mÞ À1 , corresponding to the pairs ððkÞ; ðk; mÞÞ produced by the Digital Signature Algorithm and by its modifications (including the elliptic curve version) has been used in [3, 7, 8] to give a rigorous proof of a certain weakness in these schemes. We recall that the Digital Signature Algorithm is a variant of the ElGamal signature with p À 1 replaced by a prime divisor q of p À 1, see [6, 12] . Also, ðkÞ is now the results of the double reduction of g k , firstly modulo p and then modulo q. This double reduction erases the arithmetic structure of exponential function and makes the studying of the pairs ððkÞ; ðk; mÞÞ much more complicated. In particular, despite that, as we have mentioned, the uniformity of distribution results have been proved for the ratios ðkÞðk; mÞ À1 , it is still an open problem to establish such a result for the pairs ððkÞ; ðk; mÞÞ themselves.
Our result is based on a new upper bound of exponential sums with linear combinations of rðkÞ and sðk; mÞ which can be of independent interest.
Throughout the paper the implied constants in symbols 'O' and 5 may occasionally, where obvious, depend on the small positive parameter E and are absolute otherwise (we recall that U ¼ OðV Þ and U 5V are equivalent). They all are effective and can be explicitly evaluated.
EXPONENTIAL SUMS
For an integer m ! 2, we define e m ðzÞ ¼ expð2piz=mÞ and consider exponential sums
e p ðarðkÞÞe N ðbsðk; mÞÞ:
Here we obtain some results about exponential sums with rðkÞ and sðk; mÞ which can be of independent interest. We need the following estimate which is Corollary 1 of [5] (where we take into account that deg x ¼ 2 in the notation of that paper). 
where V is the number of solutions of the congruence
or equivalently of the congruence
Therefore,
where U j is the number of solutions of the congruence
In particular, U 0 ¼ W . Using Lemma 1, we derive
Therefore V dW and from (2) we obtain the desired result. &
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ELLIPTIC CURVE ELGAMAL SIGNATURE

DISTRIBUTION OF SIGNATURES
Here we obtain our main result. Given a set S of T points ðu j ; v j Þ 2 ½0; 1 2 , j ¼ 1; . . . ; T , of the unit square, we define the discrepancy DðSÞ of this set as
where the supremum is taken over all boxes B ¼ ½a; b Â ½g; d ½0; 1 2 , jBj ¼ ðb À aÞðd À gÞ and A S ðBÞ is the number of points of this set which hit B.
According to a standard principle, we can bound the discrepancy DðSÞ by bounding the corresponding exponential sums. For arbitrary sets such a relation is given by the Erdos-Turan-Koksma inequality (see [2, Theorem 1 .21]) which we present in the following form.
For an integer a we define % a a ¼ maxfjaj; 1g.
Lemma 4. For any integer L ! 1, the bound 
Now, the first term never dominates, and substituting b ¼ cd, we obtain Hence, the first term in (3) never dominates, and the result follows. &
We remark that for any practically useful hash function o ¼ OðN À1þe Þ (in fact, one should even expect o $ 1=N ), the bound of Theorem 5 becomes of the form DðSÞ ¼ OðN À1=2þe Þ. Finally, we note that unfortunately our analysis cannot be extended to the elliptic curve analogue of the digital signature scheme, see [1] .
As usual F p and Zp denote fields of p elements and the residue ring modulo p À 1, respectively. We assume that F p consists of elements f0; 1; . . . ; p À 1g and Zp consists of elements f0; 1; . . . ; p À 2g. We also denote by Zp * the group of units of Zp.
For integers s and m ! 1 we denote by bs m c the remainder of s on division by m. We also use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z > 0.
